Realistic Decision Theory
Rules for Nonideal Agents in Nonideal Circumstances
Weirich, Paul Professor of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2004
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-517125-9
doi:10.1093/019517125X.003.0010
Paul Weirich
This chapter combines adjustments for removal of idealizations. It recommends maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options, using a quantization of conscious beliefs and desires, after making reasonable efforts to form and become aware of relevant beliefs and desires, acquire pertinent a priori knowledge, and correct unacceptable mistakes. Future work on realistic decision theory will explore planning, time preference, attitudes to risk, and equilibrium in cooperative games.
Keywords: cooperative game, idealization, plan, risk, time preference,
doi:10.1093/019517125X.003.0010
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