Subject: Philosophy Book Title: Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Clarke, Randolph,
Associate Professor of Philosophy,
University of Georgia
Print publication date: 2003
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515987-5 doi:10.1093/019515987X.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents’ control. This book examines three main types of libertarian views—noncausal, event-causal, and agent-causal—to see how well they can meet such challenges. Noncausal accounts are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation. Event-causal and agent-causal accounts are defended against a number of objections. But if both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, then there is no adequate account of free will.
Keywords: action, agent-causation, causation, control, determinism, explanation, free will, incompatibilism, indeterminism, libertarianism, moral responsibility, reason-explanation Table of Contents
Introduction
1.
Incompatibilism
2.
Active Control and Causation
3.
Event-Causal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation
4.
Deliberative Libertarian Accounts
5.
The Problem of Diminished Control
6.
The Problem of Value
7.
The Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions
8.
An Integrated Agent-Causal Account
9.
Agent Causation and Control
10.
Substance and Cause
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
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doi:10.1093/019515987X.001.0001
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