Abstract: What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self-control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal-directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.

Keywords: agency, causal theory of human agency, Alfred Mele, moral theory, motivation, motivational explanation, motivational strength, philosophy, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, practical reasoning, reasons, self-control