Motivation and Agency
Mele, Alfred R. Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University
Print publication date: 2003 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515617-1




10 Human Agency Par Excellence
doi:10.1093/019515617X.003.0011

Alfred R. Mele
Abstract: Rebuts an objection David Velleman has raised against what he calls “the standard story of human action.” It is argued that the objection is misguided. The chapter reinforces the significance of various aspects of the causal theory of human agency developed in this book and shows more fully and explicitly how that theory applies to the upper range of human action, or what may be regarded as human action par excellence.

Keywords: action, agency, causal theory of human agency, Velleman,

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Contents
 
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Full Book Contents
Introduction
I Motivation and Action
1 Motivation and Desire
2 Goal-Directed Action
II Motivation and Normativity
3 Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons
4 The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning
5 Moral Motivation and Moral Ought-Beliefs
6 Attitudes That Essentially Encompass Motivation to Act
III Strength and Control
7 Motivational Strength
8 Control and Self-Control
IV Decision, Agency, and Belief
9 Deciding
10 Human Agency Par Excellence
11 Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations
Bibliography
Index
 
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