Mele, Alfred R. Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University
Print publication date: 2003 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515617-1







doi:10.1093/019515617X.003.0010

Alfred R. Mele
Abstract: This chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to shed light on how decisions are to be explained. This chapter defends the idea that to decide to do something is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to do it. Actively forming an intention is distinguished from passively acquiring one, and the bearing of reasons and motivational strength on deciding is discussed.

Keywords: deciding, decision, intention, mental action, motivational strength, reasons,

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I Motivation and Action
II Motivation and Normativity
III Strength and Control
IV Decision, Agency, and Belief