Making Things Happen
A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, James Professor of Philosophy, California Institute of Technology
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515527-3
doi:10.1093/0195155270.003.0004
James Woodward
This chapter explores the philosophical background to the notion of causal explanation, focusing on the Deductive-Nomological Model of explanation and the role of laws in explanation and in causal claims. A number of different theses about the role of laws are distinguished: the thesis that at least one law underlies every true causal or explanatory claim, the semantic thesis that all causal claims entail the existence of laws, in virtue of their meaning, the epistemological thesis that knowledge of laws is necessary for establishing causal claims, and the explanation thesis that laws are part of every acceptable causal explanation. Only the first “underlying” thesis is defensible.
Keywords: Deductive-Nomological model,, laws,, underlying thesis,, epistemological thesis,, explanation thesis,
doi:10.1093/0195155270.003.0004
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