Autonomous Agents
From Self-Control to Autonomy
Mele, Alfred R. Professor of Philosophy, Davidson College
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515043-8







doi:10.1093/0195150430.003.0006

Alfred R. Mele
Abstract: Defends and explains the possibility of emotional analogs of akratic and self-controlled actions. It is explained how people can avoidably acquire and continue to have feelings or emotions that they judge it best not to have and how they can exercise self-control to avoid this. Our emotions are often products of such things as desires, habits of interpretation, learned patterns of emotional response, other emotions, and our physiological condition. The possibility of akratic feelings rests on the possibility that the evaluations that ground some better judgments about particular feelings neither fully fix nor exactly gauge the causal power of what produces those feelings. When there is a mismatch between the determinants of our feelings and our better judgments and when what we are feeling is subject to our control, akratic feelings are possible.

Keywords: action, akrasia, control, emotion, evaluation, feelings, judgment, self-control,

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Part I
Part II