|
Mele, Alfred R.
Professor of Philosophy, Davidson College
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-515043-8 |
|
|
doi:10.1093/0195150430.003.0013
Abstract: Argues that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than that there are not. Agnostic autonomism is defended: the position affirms the existence of autonomous agents while being agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy. The defense is based on an examination of the philosophical advantages and disadvantages of four positions: agnostic autonomism, compatibilist belief in autonomy, incompatibilist belief in autonomy (libertarianism), and the belief that there are no autonomous agents (nonautonomism). If compatibilism is true, there is a strong case – grounded partly in human experience – for the existence of autonomous human agents; even if compatibilism is false, the nonautonomist is no better off than the libertarian; and given the absence of a knockdown argument for incompatibilism, the agnostic autonomist has a significant edge over the nonautonomist.
Keywords: agnostic autonomism, autonomy, compatibilism, determinism, experience, incompatibilism, libertarianism,
|
|
|
|
|