Mele, Alfred R. Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University
Rawling, Piers Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-514539-7







doi:10.1093/0195145399.003.0003

Gilbert Harman
Abstract: Harman distinguishes between two uses of the term “logic”: as referring either to the theory of implication or to the theory of reasoning, which are quite distinct. His interest here is reasoning: a process that can modify intentions and beliefs. To a first approximation, theoretical reasoning is concerned with what to believe and practical reasoning is concerned with what to intend to do, although it is possible to have practical reasons to believe something. Practical considerations are relevant to whether to engage in theoretical inquiry into a given question, the extent of time and other resources to devote to such inquiry, and whether and when to end such inquiry. Simplicity and conservatism play a role in theoretical reasoning that can be given a practical justification without allowing wishful thinking into theoretical reasoning, a justification that can also be given a non-practical interpretation.

Keywords: belief, conservatism, inquiry, intention, logic, practical, reasoning, simplicity, theoretical,

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part I THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY
part ii RATIONALITY IN SPECIFIC DOMAINS