Mele, Alfred R. Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University
Rawling, Piers Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-514539-7







doi:10.1093/0195145399.003.0020

Paul. Weirich
Abstract: Weirich examines three competing views entertained by economic theory about the instrumental rationality of decisions: the first says to maximize self-interest, the second to maximize utility, and the third to satisfice, that is, to adopt a satisfactory option. Critics argue that the first view is too narrow, that the second overlooks the benefits of teamwork and planning, and that the third, when carefully formulated, reduces to the second. Weirich defends a refined version of the principle to maximize utility. A broad conception of utility makes it responsive to the motives and benefits critics allege it overlooks. He discusses generalizations of utility theory to extend it to nonquantitative cases and other cases with nonstandard features.

Keywords: benefit, economics, instrumental rationality, maximization, nonquantitative, planning, satisficing, self-interest, teamwork, utility,

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part I THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY
part ii RATIONALITY IN SPECIFIC DOMAINS