Abstract: What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic-situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem-Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).

Keywords: epistemic-situation evidence, evidence, explanation, paradox of evidence, Peter Achinstein, philosophy, philosophy of science, potential evidence, prediction, probability, scientific discovery, scientific evidence, subjective evidence, veridical evidence