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Goldman, Alvin I.
Board of Governors Professor, Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-513892-4 |
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doi:10.1093/0195138929.003.0010
Abstract: A concept in the psychological sense is the mental representation of a category, and a mental concept is the mental representation of a mental category or type, such as belief, desire, fear, or hunger. What are the vehicles of mental concepts and what are their contents? There is a proprietary internal code, the introspective code, which employs introspection-derived mental vehicles to represent mental categories. Introspection-based concepts bear some similarity to the notion of self-directed recognitional concepts, articulated by Loar. This approach contrasts with the functional-role approach to mental concepts that is naturally associated with theory theory.
Keywords: concepts, contents, functional role, internal code, introspective code, Loar, mental vehicles,
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