Pathways to Knowledge
Private and Public
Goldman, Alvin I. Regents Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona
Print publication date: 2002 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-513879-5







doi:10.1093/0195138791.003.0004

Alvin I. Goldman
Abstract: How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental-state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being a basic evidential source is to interpret their subject matter in psychologistic terms. Intuitions provide evidence about the contents of the intuiter's concept, where “concept” is understood as a psychological structure.

Keywords: concepts, evidence, intuitional evidence, intuitions, philosophical theory,

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Part I Internalism, the A Priori, and Epistemic Virtue
Part II Intuition, Introspection, and Consciousness
Part III Social Epistemology