The Riddle of Hume's Treatise
Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion
Russell, Paul Professor of Philosophy, University of British Columbia
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-511033-3
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0015
 

Paul Russell
This chapter provides a general interpretation of the irreligious character of Hume's sceptical intentions in the Treatise. Although the Treatise remains the primary concern, the discussion also covers Hume's later philosophical works. Hume's basic aim is to reveal the “weakness and uncertainty of mere human reason" so that he can show that all speculations that reach beyond “the common affairs of life"—specifically, those that are encouraged by “superstition"—should be abandoned. This is the principal lesson of the Conclusion of Book I (T, 1.4.7). This general account of Hume's skeptical commitments serves as the foundation for a solution to the problem of the “riddle” of the Treatise.
Keywords: Pierre Bayle,, common life,, dogmatism,, fideism,, Thomas Hobbes,, human understanding,, naturalism,, natural religion,, Pyrrhonism,, skepticism.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195110333.003.0015
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Part I Riddles, Critics, and Monsters: Text and Context
Part II The Form and Face of Hume's System
Part III The Nature of Hume's Universe
Part IV THE ELEMENTS OF VIRTUOUS ATHEISM
Part V HUME'S PHILOSOPHY OF IRRELIGION