Abstract: That our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well-off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well-off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.

Keywords: Liberationism, moral intuition, morality, Preservationism, projective separating, protophysical thinking, value, wrong