Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation
Inness, Julie C.,
Assistant Professor of Philosophy,
Mount Holyoke College
Print publication date: 1996
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-510460-8 doi:10.1093/0195104609.001.0001 |
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Abstract:
From the Supreme Court to the bedroom, privacy is an intensely contested interest in our everyday lives and privacy law. Some people appeal to privacy to protect such critical areas as abortion, sexuality, and personal information. Yet, privacy skeptics argue that there is no such thing as a right to privacy. I argue that we cannot abandon the concept of privacy. If we wish to avoid extending this elusive concept to cover too much of our lives or shrinking it to cover too little, we must come to understand it. After exploring the privacy arguments of philosophers and constitutional and tort privacy law, I argue for a new definition of privacy and an explanation of its value that clarifies and resolves many of our conflicts. Privacy is critical because it allows us to protect a realm in which we can have intimate relations with others.
Keywords: abortion, Constitutional privacy law, intimacy, isolation, privacy, privacy law, sexuality, tort privacy law Table of Contents
Preface
1.
Introduction: The Chaotic World of Privacy
2.
Common Debates in the Philosophical and Legal Privacy Literature
3.
The Threatened Downfall of Privacy: Judith Jarvis Thomson's “The Right to Privacy” and Skepticism About Privacy
4.
Beyond Isolation: A Control-Based Account of Privacy
5.
Information, Access, or Intimate Decisions About Our Actions? The Content of Privacy
6.
Intimacy: The Core of Privacy
7.
Personhood or Close Relationships? The Value of Privacy
8.
Intimacy-Based Privacy: The Answer to Legal Privacy Debates
9.
In Conclusion: Answers and New Questions
Bibliography
Index
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