Kant maintains that “rational nature exists as end-in-itself” and thus you must “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” As Korsgaard has emphasized, Kant presents a transcendental argument for the unconditional value of rational nature. According to Kant, happiness is indeed also valued as an end, but its value is nonetheless conditioned by the value-conferring power of rational nature. In this chapter, Kant's conceptions of intrinsic value, the goodness of ends and means, and the idea of an end-in-itself are explained. Problems for the argument for the priority of rationality are also explored.
Keywords: end-in-itself, goodness, happiness, humanity, intrinsic value, Korsgaard, rational, rationality, transcendental argument, unconditional value