Scheffler, Samuel
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley
Print publication date: 1994
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-508564-8
doi:10.1093/0195085647.001.0001
Abstract:
This book defends a conception of morality as moderate in content and pervasive in scope, and as possessing an authority that derives in part from its deep roots in human psychology. According to Scheffler, the point of view of morality and that of enlightened self-interest stand in a relation of potential congruence, a relation that he explains by reference to three central ideas. The first is that even though moral considerations and considerations of self-interest do sometimes conflict; moral norms must be capable of integration into a coherent, attractive human life. The second is that individuals can develop psychological structures that make moral motivation possible and that shape individual interests so as to reduce the conflict between the moral and the personal points of view. And the third idea is that it is a practical, social task to achieve a measure of fit between the demands of morality and the interests of the individual. The view of morality developed in the book embodies what Scheffler calls an Ideal of Humanity, and Scheffler maintains that this ideal coheres with the totality of our firmly held values and considered convictions.