Lewis, David Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Print publication date: 1987 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-503646-6







doi:10.1093/0195036468.003.0002

David Lewis
Abstract: Upholds the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, and proposes a semantic analysis of counterfactual conditionals that can account for it. It also considers the asymmetry of miracles and that of overdetermination, and answers the “future similarity” objection. The paper contains five postscripts, dealing with objections and further issues arising from the proposed account.

Keywords: asymmetry, causation, counterfactual conditionals, counterfactual dependence, indeterminism, miracles, overdetermination, time's arrow,

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Part Four Counterfactuals and Time
Part Five Probability
Part Six Causation
Part Seven Dependence and Decision