Kitcher, Philip
Professor of Philosophy, University of Minnesota
Print publication date: 1985 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-503541-4
doi:10.1093/0195035410.003.0004
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-503541-4
doi:10.1093/0195035410.003.0004
3 Mathematical Intuition
If we are to obtain a priori mathematical knowledge by following proofs, then we have to be able to have a priori knowledge of the axioms. This chapter (along with Chapter 4) examines the major accounts of how such knowledge might be gained. It is argued that all these accounts fail.
Keywords: a priori, constructivism, intuition, mathematical knowledge, Platonism
Keywords: a priori, constructivism, intuition, mathematical knowledge, Platonism
doi:10.1093/0195035410.003.0004
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