Lewis, David Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
Print publication date: 1983 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-503204-8
doi:10.1093/0195032047.003.0011
 

David Lewis
Lewis attempts the synthesis of two rival accounts: the thesis, according to which languages are a semantic system abstracted from the nature and history of human affairs; and the antithesis, according to which language is a rational, convention-governed human social activity. Upon answering an extended series of objections, Lewis concludes that the philosophy of language is best understood as a single subject.
Keywords: artificial language, Chomsky, convention, grammar, Saul Kripke, natural language, philosophy of language, pragmatics, Quine, semantics, truthfulness
doi:10.1093/0195032047.003.0011
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Part One Ontology
Part Two Philosophy of Mind
Part Three Philosophy of Language