Austin, J. L. late White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Urmson, J. O.
Warnock, G. J.
Print publication date: 1979 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-283021-0







doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0007

J. L. Austin
J. O. Urmson
G. J. Warnock
Abstract: ‘Unfair to Facts’ is a follow-up on Ch. 5, addressing objections Peter Strawson raised against Austin’s view of truth as a description of the conditions that must be satisfied if we are to say of a statement that it is true. Austin addresses the objection that his description of these conditions is due to a misunderstanding about the use of ‘fact’, arguing, against Strawson, that facts are not pseudo-entities and that the notion of ‘fitting the facts’ is not a useless notion.

Keywords: Austin, fact, statement, Strawson, truth, use,

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