Austin, J. L. late White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Urmson, J. O.
Warnock, G. J.
Print publication date: 1979 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-283021-0







doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0012

J. L. Austin
J. O. Urmson
G. J. Warnock
Abstract: Picks up on a previous discussion of responsibility, freedom, and excuses (Ch. 8), in which Austin argues that, in order to discover whether someone acted freely, we must discover whether certain excuses relevant to the situation at hand are acceptable. The notion of freedom, according to this view, is intractably linked to the notion of responsibility. Chapter 12 refines the previous discussion, by illuminating the differences between the notions of purpose, intention, and deliberation in a variety of speech acts.

Keywords: Austin, deliberation, excuses, freedom, intention, purpose, responsibility, speech acts,

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