Austin, J. L. late White's Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford
Urmson, J. O.
Warnock, G. J.
Print publication date: 1979 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online:
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-283021-0
doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0001
 

J. L. Austin
J. O. Urmson
G. J. Warnock
Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle’ is a response to an article on the meaning of Agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, published by H. A. Pritchard in 1935. In this paper, Pritchard argued that Aristotle regarded Agathon to mean ‘conducive to our happiness’ and, consequently, that he maintained that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire to become happy. Austin finds fault with this view: first, Agathon in Aristotle does not have a single meaning, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggested; secondly, if one had to summarise the meaning of ‘being agathon’ in one phrase, then ‘being desired’ cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides 0x0003c40x0003cc 0x0003ac0x0003b30x0003b10x0003b80x0003cc0x0003bd (the good).
Keywords: action, Agathon, Aristotle, Austin, desire, ethics, Eudaimonia, happiness, Pritchard
doi:10.1093/019283021X.003.0001
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