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Constitutional Interpretation
The Basic Questions
Barber, Sotirios A. Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
Fleming, James E. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-532857-8
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328578.003.0005
Sotirios A. Barber
James E. Fleming
The textualist says we can find what the Constitution means by consulting the plain words of the constitutional document. The consensualist consults a current social consensus on what the words of the document mean. This chapter treats these approaches together because both claim to consult conventional understandings of the meanings of the words. It concludes that the textualist and the consensualist reason, not from plain words or social consensus, but from a conception of democracy that is controversial enough to require a philosophic defense — a defense that textualists and consensualists would but cannot responsibly avoid. The chapter also distinguishes a plain words version of textualism from an abstract version of textualism, showing that the latter is equivalent to the philosophic approach. It sketches a preliminary view of the philosophic approach and previews objections that it would be undemocratic, un-American, dangerous, and/or fruitless.
Keywords: Hugo Black, democracy, Michael Perry, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, right to abortion, Roe v. Wade, plain words version, abstract version, unenumerated fundamental rights,
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328578.003.0005
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PART I
PART II