This chapter defends the philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation. This thinking for oneself must be conducted with an attitude of self-criticism, seeing constitutional interpretation as a self-critical quest for the best understanding of the Constitution. The chapter emphasizes that the philosophic approach does not involve judges or other interpreters doing moral and political philosophy without regard to the commitments of our constitutional order. But it does involve judges making philosophic choices in elaborating the meanings of our constitutional commitments. Some jurists and scholars have objected that judges simply are not capable of discharging this responsibility. In fact, the chapter shows that all the philosophic approach requires is that judges take responsibility for the kinds of philosophic choices that they have been making all along. It also defends the philosophic approach against charges that it is undemocratic, un-American, and dangerous. It shows how it does not exclude considerations of constitutional meaning associated with other approaches but in fact represents a fusion of several approaches.
Keywords: Brown v. Board of Education, concepts, conceptions, fidelity to the Constitution as written, fusion of constitutional law and moral philosophy, judges not being philosophers, originalism, abstract version, philosophic approach,