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Subject: Economics and Finance  Book Title: Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
A Concise Course
Bergin, James , Professor of Economics, Queen's University, Ontario
Print publication date: 2005
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928029-2
doi:10.1093/0199280290.001.0001
 
Abstract: Covers a standard range of topics in microeconomics theory. These include decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, the economics of information, bargaining, principal agent problems, cooperative games, and evolutionary game theory. Coverage is at the level of a graduate course in microeconomic theory.

Keywords: bargaining, decision theory, evolutionary game theory, game theory, information economics, microeconomics
Table of Contents
Preface
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1. Decision Theory
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2. Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance
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3. Strategic Form Games
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4. Nash Equilibrium—Existence and Refinements
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5. Mechanism Design
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6. Implementation: Complete and Incomplete Information
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7. Auctions I: Independent Values
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8. Auctions II: Dependent Values
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9. Extensive Form Games
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10. Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games
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11. Repeated Games
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12. Information
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13. The Principal–Agent Problem
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14. Signaling
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15. Screening
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16. Common Knowledge
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17. Bargaining
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18. Cooperative Outcomes
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19. Anonymous Games
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20. Evolution and Learning
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Index
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doi:10.1093/0199280290.001.0001
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