The Samaritan's Dilemma
The Political Economy of Development Aid
Gibson, Clark C. University of California, San Diego
Andersson, Krister Indiana University
Ostrom, Elinor Indiana University
Shivakumar, Sujai National Research Council
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927885-5
doi:10.1093/0199278857.003.0007
Clark C. Gibson
Incentives for an aid agency’s staff to learn about sustainability of field activities is one of the most fundamental factors in that agency’s quest for sustainable development outcomes. It is essential for agencies to base their decisions about development cooperation programs on an ongoing learning and adjustment process. Drawing from the general discussion of collective-action problems in public organizations in earlier chapters, the IAD framework is employed to identify and analyze specific collective-action problems within the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and its relationships with counterparts and contractors, both at the Stockholm headquarters and in the field.
Keywords: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sweden, agency staff, sustainability, learning,
doi:10.1093/0199278857.003.0007
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PART I INTRODUCTION
PART II THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
PART III CASE STUDIES
PART IV CONCLUSION