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Gibson, Clark C.
University of California, San Diego
Andersson, Krister
Indiana University
Ostrom, Elinor
Indiana University
Shivakumar, Sujai
National Research Council
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927885-5 doi:10.1093/0199278857.003.0001 |
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This chapter argues that the incentives generated by development aid’s institutions are important in explaining its lackluster outcomes. Understanding the incentives that confront donors and recipients requires knowledge of the fundamental collective-action problems that these actors face. Such problems may lead individuals seeking to improve their lot to choose actions that actually undermine their well-being. Even before aid flows into a country, these basic, day-to-day problems need solutions if foreign assistance is to produce successful and sustainable results.
Keywords: development aid, incentives, collective action, institutions, sustainability, ownership, donors, recipients,
doi:10.1093/0199278857.003.0001
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