Efficient Monopolies
The Limits of Competition in the European Property Insurance Market
Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas von Department of Economics, University of Lausanne
Print publication date: 2004 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926881-8
doi:10.1093/0199268819.003.0006
Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg
Studies the causes and consequences of the disappearance of Germany's state property insurance monopolies. The main reasons why the German insurance monopolies did not fight hard enough to defend their interests were (1) most of them knew that they would be bought up by other local public insurance companies, and (2) the German monopolies did not have their own interest group. They were defended by the Association of Public Insurers, which had much wider interests to defend.For the small customer, the disappearance of the state monopolies was a painful event. Within five years, their premium rates rose by about 50%, and the contributions paid by the insurance companies for fire prevention fell massively.
Keywords: deregulation, Germany, premium rate, property insurance, state monopoly,
doi:10.1093/0199268819.003.0006
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