Abstract: In the twentieth century, there have been five major recessions: two in the interwar period, and three more starting in 1973, 1979, and 1989. This book focuses on events in the UK, but sets them in their international context and makes frequent comparisons with other countries. Major recessions happened at a similar time in all major countries, and the lessons are general. Three main conclusions are reached: (1) major recessions reflect abrupt failings off in demand, not supply; (2) these are due to identifiable demand shocks and to swings in consumer and business confidence that amplify the direct effects of demand shock; (3) major recessions are not predictable. After an introductory chapter, the book is arranged in three main parts: Prior assumptions and methodological preliminaries (five chapters)––the theoretical questions that arise in the course of attempts to interpret history, but are too complicated to consider during the course of the historical narrative itself; (historical) Case studies of five major recessions (four chapters); and Conclusions (three chapters––the first two provide a summary of the book). In the final chapter, the author provides an insider's view on how to avoid future severe recessions: action must be taken to control booms, which if uncontrolled will lead to a period of bust, and once a major recession has begun, fiscal and monetary policy must be adjusted to mitigate the downturn. Often unpopular with economists, this is the line that many governments and central banks take: the book may help them to have more success.

Keywords: boom, business confidence, busts, case studies, consumer confidence, demand, demand shock, fiscal policy, history, monetary policy, recession, shock, supply, UK