Abstract: The book covers the modern developments in Evolutionary Game Theory, with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. It begins with the basic ideas as they originated within the field of theoretical biology, focusing on the core notions of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Replicator Dynamics. Both the static and dynamic approaches of this biological literature are presented in detail, and the general analysis illustrated with numerous examples. It then proceeds to the formulation of a theoretical framework that is suitable for the study of social and economic phenomena from an evolutionary perspective. After a discussion of strictly deterministic dynamic models, stochastic perturbations are introduced in order to account for the social- and individual-based sources of ‘noise’ (including aggregate shocks, agents’ experimentation, and population renewal), which play an important role in evolutionary processes.Evolutionary Theory has become one of the leading approaches to understanding bounded rationality, learning, and change in complex social environments. The recent boom experienced by this discipline makes this book's systematic presentation of its fundamental contributions essential reading for any newcomer to the field. In addition, new avenues of research are suggested, and plentiful examples illustrate the theory's potential applications.

Keywords: dynamic games, evolution, innovation and invention, learning, non-cooperative games, selection