Oxford Scholarship Online: The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

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The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions Bardhan, Pranab Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley Print publication date: 1991 (this edition) Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-828762-9
12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements doi:10.1093/0198287623.003.0012 Pranab Bardhan Abstract: The author, in a brief overview of the theoretical literature on interlinked transactions, tries to balance the efficiency advantages with the possible adverse distributional consequences. Keywords: contract enforcement, distribution, efficiency, incomplete markets, interlinked transactions, tie-in sales,

Contents

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Full Book Contents

Preface

Part I General Introduction

1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development

2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics

Part II Land and Labour

3. Theories of Sharecropping

4. A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts

5. Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

6. Production Relations in Semi-Arid African Agriculture

Part III Credit and Interlinked Transactions

7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency

8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure

9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality

10. On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts

11. Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk-Neutral Agents

12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements

13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition

Part IV Marketing and Insurance

14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization

15. Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts

Part V Co-Operatives, Technology, and the State

16. Agricultural Producer Co-Operatives

17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co-Operatives

18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State

Bibliography

Index

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