Making Foreign Investment Safe
Property Rights and National Sovereignty
Wells, Louis T. Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management, Harvard Business School
Ahmed, Rafiq Exxon Corporation
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-531062-7







doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310627.003.0013

Louis T. Wells
Abstract: Indonesia's transition to democracy brought additional problems for business managers, as it opened the way for new interest groups — the press, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and labor unions — to challenge the Paiton I accord. Although Paiton's investors had built defenses using the new international system of property rights, in the end the new assurances such as arbitration and insurance provided only limited protection for the company. The Paiton dispute raises important questions about why foreign firms undertook such risky projects in the first place. One factor in the decision must have been their trust that the new assurances would be effective.

Keywords: Indonesia, power projects, foreign investment, new assurances, property rights, arbitration,

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Part I State Takeover of Infrastructure, 1967–1980
Part II Return of Private Ownership of Infrastructure: Electric Power, 1990–1997
Part III New International Property Rights in Action, 1997–2005
Part IV Revisiting Privatization and the New International Property Rights System