Oxford Scholarship Online: Repeated Games and Reputations

Repeated Games and Reputations Long-Run Relationships Mailath, George J. Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania Samuelson, Larry Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin Print publication date: 2006 (this edition) Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530079-6
9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0009 George J. Mailath Larry Samuelson Abstract: This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with a product structure and extensive form games. The chapter discusses the enforceability, identifiability, and rank conditions on the monitoring technology required for the folk theorem, and finally considers games of symmetric incomplete information. Keywords: enforceability, folk theorem, identifiability, product structure, public monitoring, rank conditions, symmetric incomplete information,