Repeated Games and Reputations
Long-Run Relationships
Mailath, George J. Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Samuelson, Larry Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530079-6




8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0008

George J. Mailath
Larry Samuelson
Abstract: This chapter uses the tools developed in Chapter 7 to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game, based on decomposing payoffs on half spaces. These bounds imply a lack of efficiency for games with binding moral hazard. Extensive illustrations are provided, primarily with the prisoners’ dilemma.

Keywords: binding moral hazard, decomposability, efficiency, half space, payoff bounds,

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Contents
 
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Full Book Contents
1 Introduction
I Games with Perfect Monitoring
2 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
3 The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
4 How Long Is Forever
5 Variations on the Game
6 Applications
II Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring
7 The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
8 Bounding Equilibrium Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
9 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
10 Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
11 Applications
III Games with Private Monitoring
12 Private Monitoring
13 Almost Public Monitoring Games
14 Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
Part IV Reputations
15 Reputations with Short-Lived Players
16 Reputations with Long-Lived Players
17 Finitely Repeated Games
18 Modeling Reputations
Bibliography
Index
 
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