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Binmore, Ken
Leverhulme Research Professor of Economics, University College London
Print publication date: 2005 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2007 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-517811-1 |
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doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0006
Abstract: Metaphysical moral theories can be loosely be divided into theories of the Good or Right. Naturalistic theories can be said to be theories of the seemly — what is appropriate in a particular place and time. This chapter explains how rights and duties can fit within a theory of the seemly. You have a right to do something if you do not have a duty not to do it. You have a duty to do something if you would otherwise diverge from equilibrium play in the social contract currently operated by your society.
Keywords: rights, duty, moral responsibility, free will,
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