Aoki, Masahiko Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor, Economics Department, Stanford University, and Director General, Research Institute, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Government of Japan
Hayami, Yujiro Director, FASID Graduate Programme, and Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924101-9
doi:10.1093/0199241015.003.0013
 

Jean-Philippe Platteau
Erika Seki
This chapter examines the rationale and the viability of pooling arrangements in coastal fisheries in Japan. It is shown that the advantages of coordination and joint operation associated with pooling are reflected in the improved performance of the pooling group. The allocation of effort between fishing locations characterized by different risks (of net damage) and productivities is much closer to optimum in the fully pooling group than in the group where the attempt to pool has largely failed.
Keywords: community arrangements, market failure, Japan, coastal fishery, pooling
doi:10.1093/0199241015.003.0013
Quick Search Form
 
scroll up fast
scroll up
 
scroll down
scroll down fast
Part I Historical and Theoretical Perspectives
Part II Community in Market Development
Part III Governance of Local Commons