Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199695331
- eISBN:
- 9780191758218
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapters in this volume aim to advance the discussion of the role of the a priori in philosophy by addressing four sets of issues. The first is whether intuitions provide evidence for ...
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The chapters in this volume aim to advance the discussion of the role of the a priori in philosophy by addressing four sets of issues. The first is whether intuitions provide evidence for philosophical theories, whether that evidence is a priori, and whether the results of experimental philosophy affect the evidential or a priori status of intuitions. The second is whether there are explanations of the a priori and what range of propositions can be justified and known a priori. The third is whether a priori justified beliefs are needed in order to avoid some skeptical worries. The fourth is whether certain recent challenges to the existence or significance of the a priori are successful.Less
The chapters in this volume aim to advance the discussion of the role of the a priori in philosophy by addressing four sets of issues. The first is whether intuitions provide evidence for philosophical theories, whether that evidence is a priori, and whether the results of experimental philosophy affect the evidential or a priori status of intuitions. The second is whether there are explanations of the a priori and what range of propositions can be justified and known a priori. The third is whether a priori justified beliefs are needed in order to avoid some skeptical worries. The fourth is whether certain recent challenges to the existence or significance of the a priori are successful.
Laurie Shrage
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153095
- eISBN:
- 9780199870615
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515309X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As ...
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This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.Less
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.
Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198713265
- eISBN:
- 9780191781711
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything ...
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This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about de se thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that de se thought motivates a revision to traditional accounts of content or positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.” However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.Less
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about de se thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that de se thought motivates a revision to traditional accounts of content or positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.” However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.
Friederike Moltmann
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199608744
- eISBN:
- 9780191747700
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608744.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view ...
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Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view that natural language allows rather generously for reference to abstracts objects of the various sorts. The project of this book is to investigate in a fully systematic way whether and how natural language permits reference to abstract objects. For that purpose, the book will introduce a great range of new linguistic generalizations and make systematic use of recent semantic and syntactic theories. It will arrive at an ontology that differs rather radically from the one that philosophers, but also linguists, generally take natural language to involve. Reference to abstract objects is much more marginal than is generally thought. Instead of making reference to abstract objects, natural language, with its more central terms and constructions, makes reference to (concrete) particulars, especially tropes, as well as pluralities of particulars. Reference to abstract objects is generally reserved for syntactically complex and less central terms of the sort the property of being wise or the number eight.Less
Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view that natural language allows rather generously for reference to abstracts objects of the various sorts. The project of this book is to investigate in a fully systematic way whether and how natural language permits reference to abstract objects. For that purpose, the book will introduce a great range of new linguistic generalizations and make systematic use of recent semantic and syntactic theories. It will arrive at an ontology that differs rather radically from the one that philosophers, but also linguists, generally take natural language to involve. Reference to abstract objects is much more marginal than is generally thought. Instead of making reference to abstract objects, natural language, with its more central terms and constructions, makes reference to (concrete) particulars, especially tropes, as well as pluralities of particulars. Reference to abstract objects is generally reserved for syntactically complex and less central terms of the sort the property of being wise or the number eight.
Paolo Mancosu
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198746829
- eISBN:
- 9780191809095
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746829.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, History of Philosophy
The book provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. The notion of abstraction in question is that ...
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The book provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. The notion of abstraction in question is that related to the use of abstraction principles in neo-logicism. The most familiar abstraction principle in this context is Hume’s Principle. Hume’s Principle says that two concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under each one of them can be put in one–one correspondence. Chapter 1 shows that abstraction principles were quite widespread in the mathematical practice that preceded Frege’s discussion of them. The second chapter provides the first contextual analysis of Frege’s discussion of abstraction principles in section 64 of the Grundlagen; the second part investigates the foundational reflection on abstraction principles in the Peanosets not by using school and Russell. Chapter 3 discusses a novel approach to measuring the size of infinite sets known as the theory of numerosities. This theory assigns numerosities to infinite sets not by using one–one correspondence but by preserving the part–whole principle, namely the principle according to which if a set A is strictly included in a set B, then the numerosity of A is strictly smaller than the numerosity of B. Mancosu shows how this new development leads to deep mathematical, historical, and philosophical problems. Chapter 4 brings the previous strands together by offering some surprising novel perspectives on neo-logicism.Less
The book provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. The notion of abstraction in question is that related to the use of abstraction principles in neo-logicism. The most familiar abstraction principle in this context is Hume’s Principle. Hume’s Principle says that two concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under each one of them can be put in one–one correspondence. Chapter 1 shows that abstraction principles were quite widespread in the mathematical practice that preceded Frege’s discussion of them. The second chapter provides the first contextual analysis of Frege’s discussion of abstraction principles in section 64 of the Grundlagen; the second part investigates the foundational reflection on abstraction principles in the Peanosets not by using school and Russell. Chapter 3 discusses a novel approach to measuring the size of infinite sets known as the theory of numerosities. This theory assigns numerosities to infinite sets not by using one–one correspondence but by preserving the part–whole principle, namely the principle according to which if a set A is strictly included in a set B, then the numerosity of A is strictly smaller than the numerosity of B. Mancosu shows how this new development leads to deep mathematical, historical, and philosophical problems. Chapter 4 brings the previous strands together by offering some surprising novel perspectives on neo-logicism.
Philip A Ebert and Marcus Rossberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199645268
- eISBN:
- 9780191755330
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The collection contains an extensive introduction and 16 original papers on the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Abstractionism—a position in the philosophy of mathematics which is a ...
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The collection contains an extensive introduction and 16 original papers on the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Abstractionism—a position in the philosophy of mathematics which is a development of Frege’s original Logicism. The collection is structured as follows: After an extensive editors’ introduction to the topic of abstractionism, part II contains five contributions that deal with semantics and metaontology of Abstractionism, as well as the so-called Caesar Problem. Part III collects four contributions that discuss abstractionist epistemology, focusing on the idea of implicit definitions and non-evidential warrants (entitlements) to account for a priori mathematical knowledge. Four papers in part IV concern the mathematics of Abstractionism, in particular the issue of impredicativity, the Bad Company objection, and the question of abstractionist set theory. The last section contains three contributions that discuss Frege’s application constraint within an abstractionist setting.Less
The collection contains an extensive introduction and 16 original papers on the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Abstractionism—a position in the philosophy of mathematics which is a development of Frege’s original Logicism. The collection is structured as follows: After an extensive editors’ introduction to the topic of abstractionism, part II contains five contributions that deal with semantics and metaontology of Abstractionism, as well as the so-called Caesar Problem. Part III collects four contributions that discuss abstractionist epistemology, focusing on the idea of implicit definitions and non-evidential warrants (entitlements) to account for a priori mathematical knowledge. Four papers in part IV concern the mathematics of Abstractionism, in particular the issue of impredicativity, the Bad Company objection, and the question of abstractionist set theory. The last section contains three contributions that discuss Frege’s application constraint within an abstractionist setting.
Jay F. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199275816
- eISBN:
- 9780191699849
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275816.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from ...
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This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from whom we still have much to learn, intelligently and creatively responding to significant questions that transcend his work's historical setting. The book's main project is to command a clear view of how Kant understands various perennial problems, how he attempts to resolve them, and to what extent he succeeds. The constructive portions of the First Critique—the Aesthetic and Analytic—are explored in detail; the Paralogisms and Antinomies more briefly. At the same time the book is an introduction to the challenges of reading the text of Kant's work and, to that end, selectively adopts a more rigorous historical and exegetical stance.Less
This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from whom we still have much to learn, intelligently and creatively responding to significant questions that transcend his work's historical setting. The book's main project is to command a clear view of how Kant understands various perennial problems, how he attempts to resolve them, and to what extent he succeeds. The constructive portions of the First Critique—the Aesthetic and Analytic—are explored in detail; the Paralogisms and Antinomies more briefly. At the same time the book is an introduction to the challenges of reading the text of Kant's work and, to that end, selectively adopts a more rigorous historical and exegetical stance.
Susan C. C. Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199977383
- eISBN:
- 9780199369928
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199977383.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book examines both standard practice and ongoing controversies in social, medical, scientific, ethical, and philosophical approaches to ADHD. The complex web of concepts, data, needs, and ...
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This book examines both standard practice and ongoing controversies in social, medical, scientific, ethical, and philosophical approaches to ADHD. The complex web of concepts, data, needs, and attitudes is not fully unified. But, overall, the book argues, current approaches to research and care accidentally reinforce intolerance of ADHD-diagnosed people, and simultaneously slow down growth in knowledge. To avoid these outcomes, the wide range of people involved with ADHD—including clinicians, scientists, educators, parents, policy-makers, and diagnosed individuals—need to jointly re-examine and change the attitudes, concepts, and practices typically taken toward ADHD. The book demonstrates how we derived our current medical, scientific, and social concepts of ADHD, shows why the concepts we now use are optional, and explains that we need change for both ethical and epistemic reasons. Ethically, we need new approaches because our current concepts and practices, which center on DSM-defined ADHD, dichotomization of “ADHD” from “non-ADHD,” and intervening on individuals rather than society, embed values that reflect and reinforce intolerance. Epistemically, opposition to alternatives has created a relative stasis in our understanding of ADHD. The book argues that any change will need to recognize the centrality of both facts and values to improved scientific, medical, and social approaches to ADHD. Shared goals of increasing knowledge, providing new options for diagnosed people, and decreasing stigmatization will drive the much-needed change; adopting inclusive, responsive decision making in all areas of practice will foster it.Less
This book examines both standard practice and ongoing controversies in social, medical, scientific, ethical, and philosophical approaches to ADHD. The complex web of concepts, data, needs, and attitudes is not fully unified. But, overall, the book argues, current approaches to research and care accidentally reinforce intolerance of ADHD-diagnosed people, and simultaneously slow down growth in knowledge. To avoid these outcomes, the wide range of people involved with ADHD—including clinicians, scientists, educators, parents, policy-makers, and diagnosed individuals—need to jointly re-examine and change the attitudes, concepts, and practices typically taken toward ADHD. The book demonstrates how we derived our current medical, scientific, and social concepts of ADHD, shows why the concepts we now use are optional, and explains that we need change for both ethical and epistemic reasons. Ethically, we need new approaches because our current concepts and practices, which center on DSM-defined ADHD, dichotomization of “ADHD” from “non-ADHD,” and intervening on individuals rather than society, embed values that reflect and reinforce intolerance. Epistemically, opposition to alternatives has created a relative stasis in our understanding of ADHD. The book argues that any change will need to recognize the centrality of both facts and values to improved scientific, medical, and social approaches to ADHD. Shared goals of increasing knowledge, providing new options for diagnosed people, and decreasing stigmatization will drive the much-needed change; adopting inclusive, responsive decision making in all areas of practice will foster it.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ...
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This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.Less
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.
Gwen Bradford
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198714026
- eISBN:
- 9780191782473
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Achievement is a central element in the best human lives. But just what is achievement? And why is achievement valuable? Achievements have a common structure: a process culminates in a product. But ...
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Achievement is a central element in the best human lives. But just what is achievement? And why is achievement valuable? Achievements have a common structure: a process culminates in a product. But of course not just any process and product together makes an achievement. The process of an achievement is difficult, and it culminates in the product in a way that is competent. These two elements—difficulty and competent causation—are the two essential features of achievements, and are also sources of value for all achievements. The best account to capture their value is a perfectionist theory, according to which the exercise of our characteristically human capacities has intrinsic value. But not just any perfectionist account will do. Perfectionism must acknowledge that the will is among the characteristic capacities. This book investigates the nature and value of achievements, and proposes a new strand of perfectionism to account for their value.Less
Achievement is a central element in the best human lives. But just what is achievement? And why is achievement valuable? Achievements have a common structure: a process culminates in a product. But of course not just any process and product together makes an achievement. The process of an achievement is difficult, and it culminates in the product in a way that is competent. These two elements—difficulty and competent causation—are the two essential features of achievements, and are also sources of value for all achievements. The best account to capture their value is a perfectionist theory, according to which the exercise of our characteristically human capacities has intrinsic value. But not just any perfectionist account will do. Perfectionism must acknowledge that the will is among the characteristic capacities. This book investigates the nature and value of achievements, and proposes a new strand of perfectionism to account for their value.
