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In the latter part of the 19th century, Walter Bagehot wrote a classic account of the British constitution as it had developed during Queen Victoria's reign. He argued that the late Victorian constitution was not at all what people thought it was. In this book, the author argues that the same is true at the beginning of this century. Most people are aware that a series of major constitutional changes has taken place, but few recognize that their cumulative effect has been to change entirely the nature of Britain's constitutional structure. The old constitution has gone. The author insists that the new constitution is a mess, but one that we should probably try to make the best of. This book is neither a reference book nor a textbook. Like Bagehot's classic, it is written with wit and mordant humour — by someone who is a journalist and political commentator as well as a distinguished academic. Highly charged issues that remain to be settled concern the relations between Scotland and England and the future of the House of Lords. A reformed House of Lords, the author fears, could wind up comprising ‘a miscellaneous assemblage of party hacks, political careerists, clapped-out retired or defeated MPs, has-beens, never-weres and never-could-possibly-bes’. The book is the product of a lifetime's reflection on British politics and essential reading for anyone interested in how the British system has changed and how it is likely to change in future.

This book examines the transformation of governing arrangements in Britain from stagnation in the first two-thirds of the 20th century to hyper-innovation. These two phases were connected by crisis, namely, a crisis of economic policy and the crisis of the content of rule itself. The collapse of the club system is also discussed to explain the reasons behind the hostility towards the new regulatory state.

This book explores how the governmental elites in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa understand their Westminster system. It examines in detail four interrelated features of Westminster systems: firstly, the increasing centralization in collective, responsible cabinet government; second, the constitutional convention of ministerial and collective responsibility; third, the role of a professional, non-partisan public service; and finally, parliament's relationship to the executive. The book explains the changes that have occurred in the Westminster model by analyzing four traditions: royal prerogative, responsible government, constitutional bureaucracy, and representative government. It suggests that each tradition has a recurring dilemma, between centralization and decentralization, party government and ministerial responsibility, professionalization and politicization, and finally elitism and participation. The chapter goes on to argue that these dilemmas recur in four present-day debates: the growth of prime ministerial power, the decline in individual and collective ministerial accountability, politicization of the public service, and executive dominance of the legislature. It concludes by identifying five meanings of, or narratives about, Westminster. Firstly, ‘Westminster as heritage’ — elite actors' shared governmental narrative understood as both precedents and nostalgia. Second, ‘Westminster as political tool’ — the expedient cloak worn by governments and politicians to defend themselves and criticize opponents. Third, ‘Westminster as legitimizing tradition’ — providing legitimacy and a context for elite actions, serving as a point of reference to navigate this uncertain world. Fourth, ‘Westminster as institutional category’ — a useful descriptor of a loose family of governments with shared origins and characteristics. Finally, ‘Westminster as an effective political system’ —a more effective and efficient political system than consensual parliamentary governments. Westminster is a flexible family of ideas that is useful for many purposes and survives, even thrives, because of its meaning in use to elite actors.

What do we really mean when we say a political party has changed? And exactly what is it that drives that change? Political scientists working in the comparative tradition have come up with a general explanation that revolves around the role of election defeats and loss of office, and around changes of leader and factions. But how well does that explanation cope when subjected to a historically-grounded and therefore robust examination? This book attempts to answer that question by subjecting the common wisdom to a real-world, over-time test using half a century in the life of one of the world’s oldest and most successful political parties to provide a series of in-depth case studies. What do the periods spent in both opposition and government by the British Conservatives since 1945 tell us about what drives parties to change their sales-force, the way they organise, and the policies they come up with? Using internal papers, memos and minutes of meetings from party archives, along with historical and contemporary accounts, memoirs and interviews, this book maps the extent of change and then explores what may have driven it. The conventional wisdom, it turns out, is not necessarily wrong but incomplete, requiring both qualification and supplementation. This approachably-written book suggests when, how and why.

The delegation of functions and responsibilities to quasi-autonomous bodies operating with a significant degree of autonomy arguably empowers governments to address a wide range of social issues simultaneously without having to be involved with the minutiae of day-to-day socio-political interactions. Delegation therefore provides a structural and esoteric capacity beyond the cognitive and physical limits of politicians. There is nothing wrong with delegation as such. The problem relates to the failure to manage delegation in Britain. And yet we actually know very little about how the state beyond the core actually operates, how many bodies exist, what they do, how they are recruited, or why they were created. These gaps in our knowledge are all the more problematic in light of recent pronouncements by politicians at the national and European levels that ‘depoliticization’ is a central strand of their approach to governing. This book seeks to fill these gaps in our knowledge while at the same time cultivating a more balanced or sophisticated approach to the study of delegation. Delegated public bodies as they have been used as a tool of governance in the past should not be confused with how they might be used in the future. This book draws upon research conducted within the very core of the British political system during a Whitehall Fellowship within the Cabinet Office. It argues that the British state is ‘walking without order’ due to a general acceptance of the logic of delegation without any detailed or principled consideration of the administrative of democratic consequences of this process.

Although there is no doubt that the constitution has been significantly reformed since the election of New Labour in May 1997 the degree to which these reforms have altered the nature of democracy in the United Kingdom remains highly contested. A major problem within this debate is that it has become polarized around a binary distinction between power‐sharing and power‐hoarding models of democracy when the contemporary situation is actually far more complex. This book draws upon theories and methods from comparative political analysis in order to argue and then demonstrate three central and inter‐related arguments. Firstly, that the distinctive element of ‘New’ Labour's approach to constitutional engineering is not that it has shifted the nature of democracy in the United Kingdom from one model to another but has instead sought to apply different models at the periphery and core: bi‐constitutionality. Secondly, that contemporary evidence of both increasing levels of public disengagement from conventional politics and falling levels of public trust in politicians, political institutions and political processes originate from the ‘expectations gap’. This ‘gap’ is created by the process of political competition artificially increases public expectations; only for these expectations to be dashed as the elected party either seeks to renege upon certain pre‐election commitments or fails to achieve them. Finally, democracy in the United Kingdom is currently drifting. The old rules do not appear to suit the new game, and yet the government continues to insist that the old rules still apply. The critical challenge for any future government, of any political complexion, will be to articulate a new form of constitutional morality with the capacity to clarify exactly what its reforms in the sphere of constitutional reform and democratic renewal are seeking to achieve.

Literary claims to ownership of the third culture of sociology are considered and the rise of scientific method traced. The institutional history is summarized from the establishment of a chair of sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1907. Phases of expansion (1950–67), revolt (1968–75) and uncertainty (1976–2000) are described. Analysis of the professors—their origins, careers and fame—is presented. A content analysis of three leading British journals of sociology is reported. An epilogue is finally added of eight essays by well‐known sociologists—A. H. Halsey, Z. Bauman, C. Crouch, A. Giddens, A. Oakley, J. Platt, W.G. Runciman, and J. Westergaard.

After three hundred years, the Anglo-Scottish Union is in serious difficulty. This is not because of a profound cultural divide between England and Scotland but because recent decades have seen the rebuilding of Scotland as a political community while the ideology and practices of the old unionism have atrophied. Yet while Britishness is in decline, it has not been replaced by a dominant ideology of Scottish independence. Rather Scots are looking to renegotiate union to find a new place in the Isles, in Europe and in the world. There are few legal, constitutional or political obstacles to Scottish independence, but an independent Scotland would need to forge a new social and economic project as a small nation in the global market-place, and there has been little serious thinking about the implications of this. Short of independence, there is a range of constitutional options for renegotiating the Union to allow more Scottish self-government on the lines that public opinion seems to favour. The limits are posed not by constitutional principles but by the unwillingness of English opinion to abandon their unitary conception of the state. The end of the United Kingdom may be provoked, not by Scottish nationalism but by English unionism.

Seeks to answer the question `How does monarchy function in a modern democracy?’ Since the British Constitution is so heavily dependent upon history, the question can only be answered historically. The rules that regulate Britain's constitutional monarchy and the so‐called personal prerogatives are then discussed. Three twentieth‐century constitutional crises in which the authority of the sovereign was in question are then analysed. Finally, the book considers how the monarchy is financed, and the relationship between the monarchy and the Church of England and the monarchy and the Commonwealth. The concluding chapter considers the future of constitutional monarchy.