Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary psychology aims to understand and describe human behaviour in the light of past and continuing selection and adaptation. Still a young and developing discipline, the past couple of decades has seen enormous progress. As the science matures, its scope is inevitably beginning to broaden towards tackling contemporary issues in human society. To date, however, concerted effort to apply principle to practice has been patchy and limited in extent. This book aims to provide a foundation for an incipient focus on applications of evolutionary psychology. It draws together a collection of renowned academics from a very disparate set of fields, whose common interest lies in using evolutionary thinking to inform their research. It is the first book to overtly consider how basic evolutionary thinking is being applied to such a wide range of specific social, economic and technological problems.

The field of cognitive psychology is in a state of empirical abundance, and experts now know more about mammalian brain function than ever before. In contrast, psychological problems such as ADHD, autism, anxiety, and depression are on the rise, as are medical conditions such as diabetes, obesity, and autoimmune disorders. Why, in this era of unprecedented scientific self-knowledge, does there seem to be so much uncertainty about what humans need for optimal development? Evolution, Early Experience and Human Development asserts that human development is being misshaped by government policies, social practices, and public beliefs that fail to consider basic human needs. In this pioneering volume, scientists from a range of disciplines theorize that the rise of problems like depression and obesity is partially attributable to a disparity between the environments and conditions under which our mammalian brains currently develop and those in which the brains of our distant ancestors developed—and evolved to suit. These early environments and conditions have been named the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA. For example, healthy brain and emotional development depends to a significant extent on caregiver availability and quality of care, which is argued to be in decline by some experts; in addition, practices such as breastfeeding, cosleeping, and parental social support, which have waned in modern society, may be integral to healthy infant development. As the authors argue, without a more informed appreciation of the ideal conditions under which human brains develop and function, human beings will continue to struggle with maintaining mental and physical health, and psychological treatments will not be effective. Evolution, Early Experience and Human Development puts forth a logical, empirically based argument regarding human mammalian needs for optimal development, based on research from anthropology, neurobiology, animal science, and human development. The result is a unique exploration of evolutionary approaches to human behavior that will support the development of new policies, new attitudes toward health, and alterations in childcare practices that will better promote optimal human development.

From an early age, humans know a surprising amount about basic physical principles, such as gravity, force, mass, and shape. We can see this in the way that young children play and manipulate objects around them. The same behavior has long been observed in primates — chimpanzees have been shown to possess a remarkable ability to make and use simple tools. But what does this tell us about their inner mental state — do they therefore share the same understanding to that of a young child? Do they understand the simple, underlying physical principles involved? Though some people would say that they do, this book reports groundbreaking research that questions whether this really is the case. Challenging the assumptions so often made about apes, it offers us a rare glimpse into the workings of another mind, examining how apes perceive and understand the physical world — an understanding that appears to be both similar to, and yet profoundly different from our own.

What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developing tools to achieve some goal — chimps sharpening sticks to use as spears, bonobos using sticks to fish for termites, and New Caledonian crows developing complex tools to extracts insects from logs. Studies of tool use have been used to examine an exceptionally wide range of aspects of cognition, such as planning, problem-solving and insight, naive physics, and social relationship between action and perception. A key debate in recent research on animal cognition concerns the level of cognitive sophistication that is implied by animal tool use, and developmental psychologists have been addressing related questions regarding the processes through which children acquire the ability to use tools. In neuropsychology, patterns of impairments in tool use due to brain damage, and studies of neural changes associated with tool use, have also led to debates about the different types of cognitive abilities that might underpin tool use, and about how tool use may change the way space or the body is represented.

In every domain of reasoning — from time and space, to mental states and physical illness — humans deploy an exceedingly diverse range of intuitive ‘theories’ about how the world works. Children from diverse cultures always seem to arrive at a few, common folk theories as they hone their developing brains against roughly similar interactions with people and objects. The result is an impressive panoply of folk notions that the human species uses to explain, predict, and just plain talk about everything from why the sky is blue, to why we catch a cold when we stand out in the rain. Unquestionably, all of this ‘higher-order’ reasoning rests upon a diverse and complex tool-kit of ‘lower-order’ neural and bodily mechanisms, much of which humans share in common with other species (and which, collectively, are quite clever in their right). But this book asks a different question: Are humans alone in trying to make sense of the world by postulating theoretical entities to explain how the world works? This book approaches this highly controversial territory by investigating the seemingly prosaic topic whether chimpanzees wield roughly the same commonsense ideas about weight that human do. When it comes to the physical world, the chapters ask if chimpanzees reinterpret a broad range of primary experiences — lifting objects, seeing objects fall or collide, observing the differential effort others exert when they move objects — in terms of a common, causal mechanism which, in our everyday parlance, we refer to as ‘weight’. The question is not whether chimpanzees have a theory about weight that's any better or worse than preschool children or Einstein or modern string theorists. The question is whether chimpanzees have any theories at all. And the answer comes in the form of over thirty never-before-published experiments from a decade-long research project involving seven adult chimpanzees and 120 preschool children.