Philosophy of Mind

This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, the book explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account — such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle' account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its ‘origin’ in the agent and that our actions are ‘up to us to do and not to do’ — often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency — turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point the book makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.

Aristotle may be considered the founder of ‘faculty psychology’, the attempt to explain a variety of psychological phenomena by reference to a few inborn capacities. This study investigates his main work on psychology, the De Anima, from this perspective. It is shown how Aristotle conceives of the soul's capacities and how he uses them to account for the souls of living beings. An account is offered of how Aristotle defines the capacities in relation to their activities and proper objects. The relationship of the body to the definition the soul's capacities is also considered. Against the background of his theory of science, it is argued that the capacities of the soul serve as causal principles in the explanation of the various life forms. Detailed readings are developed of Aristotle's treatment of nutrition, perception, and intellect, which show the soul's various roles as formal, final and efficient causes. The so‐called ‘agent’ intellect is interpreted as falling outside the scope of Aristotle's natural scientific approach to the soul. Other psychological activities, various kinds of perception (including ‘perceiving that we perceive’), memory, imagination, are accounted for in their explanatory dependency on the basic capacities. The ability to move spatially is similarly explained as derivative from the perceptual or intellectual capacities. It is argued that these capacities together with the nutritive may, as basic to the definition and explanation of the various kinds of soul, be understood as ‘parts’ of the soul. The book finally considers how the account of the capacities in the De Anima is adopted and adapted in Aristotle‘s biological and minor psychological works.