History of Philosophy

This book examines Newton’s argument for universal gravity and his application of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the sun and planets. Newton’s inferences from phenomena realize an ideal of empirical success that is richer than prediction. To achieve this rich sort of empirical success a theory needs, not only to accurately predict the phenomena it purports to explain, but also, to have those phenomena accurately measure the parameters which explain them. Newton’s method aims to turn theoretical questions into ones which can be empirically answered by measurement from phenomena. Newton employs theory-mediated measurements to turn data into far more informative evidence than can be achieved by confirmation from prediction alone. Propositions inferred from phenomena are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. This methodology, guided by its rich ideal of empirical success, supports a conception of scientific progress that does not require construing it as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory of everything and is not threatened by the classic argument against convergent realism. Newton’s method endorses the radical theoretical transformation from his theory to Einstein’s. It is strikingly realized in the development and application of testing frameworks for relativistic theories of gravity. In addition, it is very much at work in cosmology today.

This book studies Locke's views on the content and method of natural philosophy. Focusing on his Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from Locke's other writings and manuscript remains, it argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society. On the question of method, this study demonstrates how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. Yet, it is argued, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that, if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a different model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science, a model based on principles established by observation. This led Locke to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, this book argues that, even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy he, was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. It takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought through an exploration of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species.

This book advocates a radical shift of concern in philosophical, historical, and sociological studies of the sciences — from answers and doctrines to questions and problems — and explores the consequences of such a shift. This book is at once naturalistic and historicist: naturalistic in considering the philosophy of the sciences, in particular as it relates to questions concerning the methods of the sciences and their justifications, to be continuous with the sciences themselves; naturalistic in connecting reality and truth in the sciences with the procedures and outcomes of scientific inquiry; historicist in taking as the basis of sound historical interpretation awareness of past material and social conditions, together with sensitivity to past agents' own modes of interpretation; historicist in holding all questions, categories, and meanings to be historicist constructs; and historicist in taking history to be the primary domain of reflection and criticism for all disciplines.