Philosophy of Law

This book revisits the theory of the sources of international law from the perspective of formalism. It critically analyzes the virtues of formalism, construed as a theory of law ascertainment, as a means of distinguishing between law and non-law. The theory of formalism is re-evaluated against the backdrop of the growing acceptance by international legal theorists of the blurring of the lines between law and non-law. At the same time, the book acknowledges that much international normative activity nowadays takes place outside the ambit of traditional international law and that only a limited part of the exercise of public authority at the international level results in the creation of international legal rules. The theory of ascertainment that the book puts forward attempts to dispel some of the illusions of formalism that accompany the delimitation of customary international law. It also sheds light on the tendency of scholars, theorists, and advocates to deformalize the identification of international legal rules with a view to expanding international law. The book seeks to revitalize and refresh the formal identification of rules by engaging with some tenets of the postmodern critique of formalism. As a result, the book not only grapples with the practice of law-making at the international level, but it also offers broad theoretical insights on international law, dealing with the main schools of thought in legal theory (positivism, naturalism, legal realism, policy-oriented jurisprudence, and postmodernism).

This book takes an inductive approach to the question of whether there is a hierarchy in international law, with human rights obligations trumping other duties. It assesses the extent to which such a hierarchy can be said to exist through an analysis of the case law of national courts. Each chapter of the book examines domestic case law on an issue where human rights obligations conflict with another international law requirement, to see whether national courts gave precedence to human rights. If this is shown to be the case, it would lend support to the argument that the international legal order is moving toward a vertical legal system, with human rights at its apex. In resolving conflicts between human rights obligations and other areas of international law, the practice of judicial bodies, both domestic and international, is crucial. Judicial practice indicates that norm conflicts typically manifest themselves in situations where human rights obligations are at odds with other international obligations, such as immunities; extradition and refoulement; trade and investment law; and environmental protection. This book sets out and analyses the relevant case law in all of these areas.

The texts of international law cannot talk — they are talked about. They passively submit to the need for interpretation and gain meaning in their use. Contrary to classic and still pervasive narrative suggesting that sovereign states make the law that constraints them, the book shows that in many and most constellations the contents of legal commitments is the product interpretation which shifts meanings and makes law. In the practice of interpretation actors compete over what the law really says and contribute to its making. What then matters in such discourse is an actor’s semantic authority — the capacity to find acceptance for interpretative claims and the ability to establish new reference points for legal discourse. The book identifies the practice of interpretation as a significant space of international lawmaking and draws specific attention to the increasing weight of international institutions in the struggle for the law. Past theoretical approaches come down with significant shortcomings in understanding interpretation as a bounded practice that has both the capacity to create as well as the faculty to control. The book leans on developments in linguistics and builds on semantic pragmatism to overcome old divides and to offer a fresh account of how the practice of interpretation makes international law. Its analytical ambition is paralleled by a discussion of the strong normative implications that immediately arise once received understandings of interpretation and sources doctrine are debunked as myopic and powerless in relation to semantic changes. The book thus closes with a discussion of the bittersweet taste of justice in legal argument, tests the potential of international law and its doctrine to respond to semantic change, and ultimately ponders the possibilities of democratic justification of semantic authority in a normative pluriverse.

The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal is the most important source of international arbitral decisions for at least the past half-century, and its decisions have contributed significantly to the development of international law and the law of international commercial transactions. This book is about the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. It seeks to preserve and to make accessible the substantial body of Awards and Decisions rendered by the Tribunal during the years since it was first established. The Tribunal’s hundreds of Awards and Decisions may be individually consulted (there are 27 volumes so far), but hitherto there has been no detailed analytical guide through its vast published work. This book provides a two-fold service. First, it quotes from the most significant Awards and Decisions at sufficient length so that both their substance and the reasoning of the Tribunal can be understood from access to the present volume alone. Second, it organizes and summarizes the decisions to facilitate finding complete texts relevant to any particular issue.

The question of the legality of humanitarian intervention is, at first blush, a simple one. The Charter of the United Nations clearly prohibits the use of force, with the only exceptions being self-defence and enforcement actions authorized by the Security Council. There are, however, long-standing arguments that a right of unilateral intervention pre-existed the Charter. This book begins with an examination of the genealogy of this right, and arguments that it may have survived the passage of the Charter, either through a loophole in Article 2(4) or as part of customary international law. A common justification for a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention concerns the failure of the collective security mechanism created after the Second World War. Chapters 4 and 5 of this book examine Security Council activism in the 1990s, notable for the plasticity of the circumstances in which the Council was prepared to assert its primary responsibility for international peace and security, and the contingency of its actions on the willingness of states to carry them out. This reduction of the Council's role from substantive to formal partly explains the recourse to unilateralism in that decade, most spectacularly in relation to the Kosovo situation. Crucially, the book argues that such unilateral enforcement is not a substitute for but the opposite of collective action. Though often presented as the only alternative to inaction, incorporating a ‘right’ of intervention would lead to more such interventions being undertaken in bad faith, it would be incoherent as a principle, and it would be inimical to the emergence of an international rule of law.

As globalisation and migration produce societies of increasing linguistic diversity, the issue of how to ensure justice between speakers of different languages becomes a pressing social concern. Matters of ‘linguistic justice’ are therefore drawing increasing scholarly attention across a range of disciplines. How does international law contribute to linguistic justice? This book explores that question by conducting a comprehensive, interdisciplinary examination of international law on language, analysing the many disparate fields of international law which affect language use both directly (human rights, minority rights, and cultural heritage laws, for example) and indirectly (international trade law and international labour standards, among others). Moving beyond the technical analysis of legal provisions, the book explores the conceptual framework which underpins international law on language, unearthing underlying assumptions and ideas about what constitutes a ‘just’ language policy from a legal perspective. In doing so, the book draws on the methodology of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, whose ideas of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ offer a way of understanding the changing significance of language to human identity, and the way in which language becomes a focal point for the exercise of social power. This analysis reveals the limitations of contemporary international law on language, and charts a course towards the achievement of greater ‘linguistic justice’.

The promotion of democracy is today a familiar feature of foreign policy, and an accepted part of the activities of international organizations. Should international law join in this move to promote democratic political arrangements? If this is so, on what basis, and with which of the many competing conceptions of democracy? Drawing on an eclectic range of source material, this book examines current debates about the emergence of an international legal ‘norm of democratic governance’, and considers how proposals for such a norm might be rearticulated to meet some of the concerns to which they give rise. It also uses these debates to illustrate some more general points about approaches to the study of international law. In doing so, the book seeks to defend an approach to international legal scholarship that takes its cue from the tradition of ideology critique.

The war on terror is remaking conventional warfare. The protracted battle against a non-state organization, the demise of the confinement of hostilities to an identifiable battlefield, the extensive involvement of civilian combatants, and the development of new and more precise military technologies have all conspired to require a rethinking of the law and morality of war. Just war theory, as traditionally articulated, seems ill-suited to justify many of the practices of the war on terror. The raid against Osama Bin Laden's Pakistani compound was the highest profile example of this strategy, but the issues raised by this technique cast a far broader net: every week the U.S. military and CIA launch remotely piloted drones to track suspected terrorists in hopes of launching a missile strike against them. In addition to the public condemnation that these attacks have generated in some countries, the legal and moral basis for the use of this technique is problematic. Is the U.S. government correct that nations attacked by terrorists have the right to respond in self-defense by targeting specific terrorists for summary killing? Is there a limit to who can legitimately be placed on the list? There is also widespread disagreement about whether suspected terrorists should be considered combatants subject to the risk of lawful killing under the laws of war or civilians protected by international humanitarian law. Complicating the moral and legal calculus is the fact that innocent bystanders are often killed or injured in these attacks. It discusses all aspects of targeted killing.