Comparative Law

The common law, despite procedural divisions, has only ever had one class of civil wrongs. The civilians, by contrast, have typically split their law of wrongs in two, one group being called ‘delicts’ and the other ‘quasi-delicts’. Yet this division, which originated in Roman law, remains mysterious: it is clear neither where the line was drawn nor why a separation was made along this line. This book does two things. In the first two parts, it investigates the origins of the division and its development in a modern civilian jurisdiction, France. What is argued for is that the Roman dichotomy was originally one between fault (culpa)-based and situational liability, which was prompted by a historical contraction of the Roman concept of a wrong (delictum). French law, building on medieval interpretations of the division, redrew the line one level higher, between deliberate and negligent wrongdoing. By doing so, it involved itself in severe taxonomical difficulties, which the book explores. The third part of the work concerns itself with the significance of the civilian division of wrongs according to degrees of blameworthiness (dolus, culpa, casus) for the common law. A rather provocative thesis is developed, in effect, that there is a strong case for the adoption of a similar trichotomy as the first-level division of the English law of civil wrongs. From its formulary age, English law has inherited an unstable taxonomy where wrongs intersect. The existence of these mismatched categories continues to cause significant difficulties, which a realignment of causes of action along the above lines would allow to sort out.

This book provides a description of the German law of unjustified enrichment. It explains how German law generally allows restitution for transfers made without legal ground (rather than on the basis of individual unjust factors), an approach which the late Peter Birks proposed for English law to adopt, and which the House of Lords was careful not to rule out for the future in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v Inland Revenue. Part I explains the workings of German unjustified enrichment law within the particular context of German contract, tort, and property law. It shows how the German general unjust enrichment clause is controlled by limiting its scope to intentional transfers, and complemented by specific grounds of unjust enrichment. This part also explains defences against and measure of enrichment claims. Part II places German law in the comparative context of three different fundamental approaches towards unjustified enrichment, shows some unexpected similarities between English and German law, and discusses whether English law could and should adopt the German approach. The book gives equal prominence to structural issues and legal doctrine on the one hand, and practical application of the law on the other. It provides leading German cases and relevant statutory provisions in English translation.