Law

This is a study of the law governing the bank–customer relationship pertaining to the disposition of funds by cheques and credit transfers, covering both paper-based and electronic payments. This book addresses, with various degrees of detail, common law, civilian, and ‘mixed’ jurisdictions, particularly in Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States. In addition to the description of the law in these jurisdictions, the book contains an in-depth analysis of the common issues and the responses to them, in light of desired policies. Accordingly, an evaluation of the various rules and proposals for reform are integral parts of the study. The book is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 is an overview of the various legal systems and fundamentals in banking and payment law, in an overall historical context. Chapter 2 deals with the banking relationship, within which collections and payments occur. It highlights the customer contract, the deposit transaction, the mandate authorizing bank collections and payments, and the debt resulting from entries to the current account. Chapter 3 covers the performance of the mandate. It discusses extensively laws governing the payment and collection of cheques and credit transfers, in the context of actual clearing and settlement mechanisms, particularly large-value transfer systems in developed countries. Chapter 4 is on payment systems misuse through fraud, either in the initiation payments or in misdirecting them. It discusses cheque forgery, unauthorized electronic funds transfers, forged cheques endorsements, and misdirected funds transfers.

The financial crisis has brought about a revival of state protectionism across the globe. Most Western leaders have made a virtue of big government and state intervention; bail-outs and Sovereign Wealth Funds have been among the first responses to the economic contraction. Company law rules are one of the instruments frequently used to restrict or to discourage integration or to deter foreign investment. Examples of the new protectionism can be seen in a wide range of legislative and regulatory measures, for instance state measures preventing foreign takeovers, ‘golden shares’ or laws on foreign direct investment targeting Sovereign Wealth Funds, mainly from Asia. This book presents research by a number of company law and EU law experts. The chapters cover a broad range of topics, spanning from takeovers/mergers over the one share-one vote debate through to the foreclosure of markets against Sovereign Wealth Funds.

This book is about testamentary formalities, that is to say, about the requirements which the law of succession imposes in order for a person to make a will. How are wills made? What precisely are the rules — as to the signature of the testator, the use of witnesses, the need for a notary public or lawyer, and so on? Is there is a choice of will-type and, if so, which type is used most often and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each? How common is will-making or do most people die intestate? What happens if formalities are not observed? How can requirements of form be explained and justified? What is the legal history of wills, the state of the law today, and the prospects for the future? Is this a fruitful topic for comparative law? The book explores these questions through a representative sample of countries in Europe as well as in the USA, Latin America, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. A final chapter draws the threads together and offers an overall assessment of the development of wills and will-making in Europe and beyond.

This book presents a detailed study on compensation and restitution in investor state arbitration pursuant to investment treaties. The study begins by examining the historical roots of the principles of reparation, restitution, and compensation in international law as reflected in the landmark Chorzów Factory case. The roots of these principles are traced to Roman law and private law concepts that entered into the European continent's legal systems. Moving to modern times, the study focuses on the principle of reparation set out in the Chorzów Factory case and its requirement that reparation put the aggrieved party in the ‘hypothetical position’ that would have existed if not for the wrongful act. Restitution, both material and judicial, is discussed as a form of reparation. Compensation, by far the more common form of reparation in modern international investment disputes, is discussed in detail. In dealing with compensation for expropriation, this book examines the recent trends in which lawful and unlawful expropriation cases are distinguished and the impact that this distinction can have on the amount of compensation. This book additionally outlines some of the main valuation and accounting methods used in setting the hypothetical position to measure compensation due. Various forms of supplemental compensation, such as moral damages, interest, or arbitration costs, may also be necessary to fully restore the hypothetical position; these are discussed along with applicable limitations. This study also sets out important principles that may limit compensation generally, such as causation and the prohibition on double counting.

The years from 2000 to 2010 were bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. This book asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The book analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

Increased regulatory competition has sharpened the comparative awareness of advantages or disadvantages of different national models of political economy, economic organisation, governance, and regulation. Although institutional change is slow and subject to functional complementarities as well as social and cultural entrenchment, at least some features of successful modern market economies have been in the process of converging over the last decades. The most important change is a shift in governance from state to the market. As bureaucratic ex-ante control is replaced by judicial ex-post control, administrative discretion is replaced by the rule of law as a set of guidelines for the economy. Furthermore, at least to some extent, public enforcement is being reduced in favour of private enforcement by way of disclosure, enhanced liability, and correspondent litigation for damages. Corporatist approaches to governance are giving way to market approaches, and outsider and market-oriented corporate governance models seem to be replacing insider-based regimes. This transition is far from smooth and poses a daunting challenge to regulators and academics trying to redefine the fundamental governance and regulatory setting. They are confronted with the task of making or keeping the national regulatory structure attractive to investors in the face of competitive pressures from other jurisdictions to adopt state-of-the-art solutions. At the same time, however, they must establish a coherent institutional framework that accommodates the efficient, modern rules with the existing and hard-to-change institutional setting. These challenges – put in a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective – are the subject of this book, which includes the world's three leading economies and their legal systems on an equal basis.

Studies of corporate governance traditionally focus on the governance problems of large publicly held firms, and policymakers' recommendations often focus on such firms. However, most small firms and in many countries, even many large companies, are non-listed. This book provides a comprehensive account of non-listed businesses and their particular governance problems. It explores current discussions and reforms in Europe, the United States, and Asia providing a state of the art account of the law and the economics. Non-listed firms encompass a vast range, from corporations with the potential to go public through family-owned firms, group-owned firms, private equity and hedge funds, to joint ventures and unlisted mass-privatized corporations with a relatively high number of shareholders. The governance of non-listed companies has traditionally been concerned with protecting investors and creditors from managerial opportunism. However, the virtual elimination of the distinction between partnerships and corporations means that an effective legal governance framework must also offer mechanisms to protect shareholders from the misconduct of other shareholders. This volume examines policy and economic measurements to develop a framework for understanding what constitutes good governance in non-listed companies. The authors examine how control is gained in the various types of closely held firms and explore the mechanisms that contribute to the development of a modern and efficient governance framework for these companies. The book concludes with an exploration of how the non-listed firm is likely to stimulate growth and extend innovation and development.

This book analyses corporate insolvency law as a coherent whole, stemming from common fundamental principles and amenable to being justified or criticized on that basis. The book explains why consistency of principle must be sought, and how it might be found in the relevant statutory and case law. It then draws on political and legal philosophy to construct an egalitarian theory for the analysis of corporate insolvency law based on the premise that all the parties affected by this law are to be treated as equals. The book argues that this theory can reconcile the dictates of fairness with the demands of economic efficiency. The theory is employed to analyze some of the most important aspects of insolvency law. Why should the individualistic method of enforcing claims against solvent companies give way to a collective method during insolvency? Why are there different formal mechanisms for dealing with troubled companies? What role does the pari passu principle play in the distribution of an insolvent company's assets? The controversial issues of whether and when secured creditors should be accorded priority over others receives detailed consideration. The functional role of the floating charge and its relationship with receivership are also analyzed in this context. The many questions relating to the operation of the new administration procedure introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 are considered in the light of principle. The book also analyzes the role of the wrongful trading provisions. It examines, finally, why insolvency law objects to certain transactions at an undervalue and those having a preferential effect.

The typical British publicly traded company has widely dispersed share ownership and is run by professionally trained managers who collectively own an insufficiently large percentage of shares to dictate the outcome when shareholders vote. This separation of ownership and control has not only dictated the tenor of corporate governance debate in Britain but serves to distinguish the UK from most other countries. Existing theories fail to account adequately for arrangements in the UK. Corporate Ownership and Control accordingly seeks to explain why ownership became divorced from control in major British companies. The book is organized by reference to the ‘sell side’, which encompasses the factors that might prompt those owning large blocks of shares to exit or accept dilution of their stake and the ‘buy side’, which involves factors that motivate investors to buy equities and deter the new shareholders from themselves exercising control. The book's approach is strongly historical in orientation, as it examines how matters evolved from the 17th century through to today. While a modern-style divorce of ownership and control can be traced back at least as far as mid-19th century railways, the ‘outsider/arm's-length’ system of ownership and control that currently characterizes British corporate governance did not crystallize until the second half of the 20th century. The book brings the story right up to date by showing current arrangements are likely to be durable. The insights the book offers correspondingly should remain salient for some time to come.

This book argues that it should be the function of company law to promote public interest. Examining a number of topical and controversial issues from this perspective, including the adequacy of corporate governance arrangements, the Nexus of Contracts theory of the company, and the role of markets, the book explains why the theory of company law has to be understood in order for the day-to-day practice of company lawyers to be fully appreciated. The book explores in some depth the protection of interests largely ignored by company law, such as those of employees and the local community, and the safeguarding of the environment from corporate abuse.