Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199588879
- eISBN:
- 9780191744716
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, General
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already ...
More
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. For it is argued here that his fundamental idea is not a new conception of language (as most commentators have supposed), but rather a revolutionary conception of what philosophy is — one that is opposed to the construction of philosophical theories. This idea is what lies behind Wittgenstein's distinctive treatments of specific issues within the subject: issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, religion, and so on. Thus the first aim of the present work is to preset a clear and compelling account of his meta-perspective, to explain and justify his view of how philosophy should (and should not) be conducted, and of what it might achieve. The second aim is to defend that view against a variety of objections, and thereby to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as a good analysis of philosophy itself. The third aim is to examine its application to a wide collection of particular topics, but most thoroughly to meaning and to experience. The centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support are admittedly controversial assumptions, but they are vindicated here — not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them. Thus the book simultaneously offers a fresh account of Wittgenstein's thought and dramatically deflationary picture of the entire subject.
Less
This book develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings (in particular, his Philosophical Investigations) that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. For it is argued here that his fundamental idea is not a new conception of language (as most commentators have supposed), but rather a revolutionary conception of what philosophy is — one that is opposed to the construction of philosophical theories. This idea is what lies behind Wittgenstein's distinctive treatments of specific issues within the subject: issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, religion, and so on. Thus the first aim of the present work is to preset a clear and compelling account of his meta-perspective, to explain and justify his view of how philosophy should (and should not) be conducted, and of what it might achieve. The second aim is to defend that view against a variety of objections, and thereby to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as a good analysis of philosophy itself. The third aim is to examine its application to a wide collection of particular topics, but most thoroughly to meaning and to experience. The centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support are admittedly controversial assumptions, but they are vindicated here — not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them. Thus the book simultaneously offers a fresh account of Wittgenstein's thought and dramatically deflationary picture of the entire subject.