Law

Examining the role of ‘open remedies’ in human rights adjudication, this book provides a new perspective informing comparative constitutional debates on how to structure institutional relationships over fundamental rights and freedoms. Open remedies declare a human rights violation but invite the other branches of government to decide what corrective action should be taken. Open remedies are premised on the need to engage institutions beyond courts in the process of thinking about and acting on human rights problems. This book considers examples across the United States, South Africa, Canada, and internationally, emphasising their similarities and differences in design and the diverse ways they could operate in practice. The book investigates these possibilities through the first systematic legal and empirical study of the declaration of incompatibility model under the United Kingdom Human Rights Act. This new model provides a non-binding declaration that the law has infringed human rights standards, for the legislature's consideration. By design, it has the potential to support democratic deliberation on what human rights require of the laws and policies of the State, however, it also carries uncertainties and risks. Providing a lucid account of existing debates on the relative roles of courts and legislatures to determine the requirements of fundamental rights commitments, the book argues that we need to look beyond the theoretical focus on rights disagreements, to how these remedies have operated in practice across the courts and the political branches of government. Importantly, we should pay attention to the nature and scope of legislative engagement in deliberation on the human rights matters raised by declarations of incompatibility. Adopting this approach, this book presents a carefully argued view of how courts have exercised this power, as well as how the UK executive and Parliament have responded to its use.

This book recounts the history of the nation's first civil rights act, from its passage in 1866 through its interpretation and reenactment in developments that reach the present day. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 created civil rights as we now know them, and it exercised a deep and continuing influence over the constitutional and statutory protection of these rights. Almost all of the controversy over civil rights, from the scope of federal prohibitions against private discrimination to the remedies available to victims of civil rights violations, finds its roots in debates over the act. These issues are important in themselves, and all the more so because they exemplify the complementary roles of the legislature and the judiciary in giving meaning to the constitutional ideal of equality in public life. This book offers an appreciation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, hitherto regarded in only selective and partial perspective, and provides a comprehensive view of the act over nearly a century and a half and a detailed account of its leading role in making civil rights a reality.

This book shows that civil disobedience is more defensible than private conscientious objection. Part I distinguishes conviction from conscience, shedding light on the former as something non-evasive and communicative, and on the latter as something much richer, namely, genuine moral responsiveness. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private ‘conscientious’ objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing. The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience. Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished.

Consociations are power-sharing arrangements, increasingly used to manage ethno-nationalist, ethno-linguistic, and ethno-religious conflicts. Current examples include Belgium, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Burundi, and Iraq. Despite their growing popularity, they have begun to be challenged before human rights courts as being incompatible with human rights norms, particularly equality and non-discrimination. This book examines the use of power-sharing agreements, their legitimacy, and their compatibility with human rights law. Key questions include to what extent, if any, consociations conflict with the liberal individualist preferences of international human rights institutions, and to what extent consociational power-sharing may be justified to preserve peace and the integrity of political settlements. In three critical cases, the European Court of Human Rights has considered equality challenges to important consociational practices, twice in Belgium and then in Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia regarding the constitution established for Bosnia Herzegovina under the Dayton Agreement. The Court's decision in Sejdic and Finci has significantly altered the approach it previously took to judicial review of consociational arrangements in Belgium. This book accounts for this change and assesses its implications. The problematic aspects of the current state of law are demonstrated. Future negotiators in places riven by potential or actual bloody ethnic conflicts may now have less flexibility in reaching a workable settlement, which may unintentionally contribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that negotiators will consider excluding regional and international courts from reviewing these political settlements.

EU Anti-Discrimination Law provides a detailed and critical analysis of the corpus of EU law prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation. It takes into account the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and it contains thorough examination of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. The book examines the background to the legislation and explains the essential characteristics and doctrines of EU law, in so far as they are relevant to the topic of anti-discrimination. It also analyses the increasingly significant general principles of EU law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the relevant law flowing from the European Convention on Human Rights. The key concepts contained in anti-discrimination law are subjected to close scrutiny. The substantive provisions of the law on equal pay and the workplace and non-workplace provisions of the governing directives are similarly examined, as are the numerous exceptions permitted to them. The complex rules governing the rights of pregnant women and those who have recently given birth are dealt with comprehensively in a separate chapter. Equality in social security schemes is also discussed. The book concludes with an assessment of the practical utility of the existing law and the current proposals for its reform.

The relationship between Islamic law and international human rights law has been the subject of considerable, and heated, debate in recent years. The usual starting point has been to test one system by the standards of the other, asking is Islamic law ‘compatible’ with international human rights standards, or vice versa. This approach quickly ends in acrimony and accusations of misunderstanding. By overlaying one set of norms on another we overlook the deeply contextual nature of how legal rules operate in a society, and meaningful comparison and discussion is impossible. Chapters in this book attempt to deepen the understanding of human rights and Islam, paving the way for a more meaningful debate. Focusing on central areas of controversy, such as freedom of speech and religion, gender equality, and minority rights, the chapters examine the contextual nature of how Islamic law and international human rights law are legitimately formed, interpreted, and applied within a community. They examine how these fundamental interests are recognized and protected within the law, and what restrictions are placed on the freedoms associated with them.

‘Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’. So reads the legal definition of slavery agreed by the League of Nations in 1926. Further enshrined in law during international negotiations in 1956 and 1998, this definition has been interpreted in different ways by the international courts in the intervening years. What can be considered slavery? Should forced labour be considered slavery? Debt-bondage? Child soldiering? Or forced marriage? This book explores the limits of how slavery is understood in law. It shows how the definition of slavery in law and the contemporary understanding of slavery has continually evolved and continues to be contentious. It traces the evolution of concepts of slavery, from Roman law through the Middle Ages, the 18th and 19th centuries, up to the modern day manifestations, including manifestations of forced labour and trafficking in persons, and considers how the 1926 definition can distinguish slavery from lesser servitudes. The book includes a set of guidelines intended to clarify the law where slavery is concerned.

The application of the Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule has divided the Justices of the Supreme Court for nearly a century. As the legal remedy for when police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a person and discover criminal evidence through illegal search and seizure, it is the most frequently litigated constitutional issue in United States courts. This book traces the rise and fall of the exclusionary rule using insight and behind-the-scenes access into the Court's thinking. Based on original archival research into the private papers of retired Justices, this analysis clarifies the motivations and thoughts that explain the Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence. It includes a comprehensive scholarly and objective discussion of the reasoning behind the Court decisions, and demonstrates that like other constitutional doctrines, the exclusionary rule is a political mechanism that expands and contracts as the times and Justices change.