Ancient Philosophy

This book focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect. Intellect comes second in Plotinus' hierarchical model of reality, after the One, which is an unknowable first cause of everything. Intellect is also the sphere of being, the Platonic Ideas, which exist as its thoughts. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that the book seeks to answer: Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? The minimal requirements thought must satisfy according to Plotinus is that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and the object itself must be varied. How are these two claims which amount to holding that Intellect is plural in two different ways related? What is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, a claim that is explored in the book. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful, and a direct intuition into ‘the things themselves’; it is presumably not even propositional. This strong notion of non-discursive thought is discussed and explained as well as Plotinus' claim that this must be the primary form of thought. The main conclusion of the book is that though clearly dependent on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, Plotinus' theory of Intellect contains very significant innovations.

The purpose of this book is to argue that Aristotle examines the question of political obligation and its limits. To prove this point, some connected issues are tackled as well, such as the ethical underpinning of Aristotle’s political thought, the normativity of his practical philosophy, and the concepts of political authority and obligation themselves. As a result, the relationship between Aristotle’s political philosophy and its modern counterpart is seen in a new light through an interdisciplinary lens.

The book begins with a discussion of the method employed by Aristotle in his social theory and its bearing upon the interests and political duties of citizens. It next studies Aristotle’s conception of nature in his practical philosophy and argues that the normative credentials of Aristotle’s ethics and politics are essentially in order. Having examined the method and the foundations of Aristotle’s social philosophy, the book moves on to a conceptual analysis of political authority and obligation to argue that they are accommodated by Aristotle in terms that are recognizably modern.

The last part of the book defends the view that according to Aristotle the authority of the state and the political bonds of citizens are essentially guided and hence limited by moral considerations. It is first argued that Aristotle raises the question of political obligation in terms not unfamiliar to modern political theory. This is followed by an examination of Aristotle’s main arguments for justifying political authority and obligation, in particular, his commitment to the view that not only irrational or immoral people but even perfect agents would still be in need of political authority. The last chapter argues that Aristotle’s philosophy of law stands against unconditional political obligation and contains a right of resistance against oppression.

Aristotle may be considered the founder of ‘faculty psychology’, the attempt to explain a variety of psychological phenomena by reference to a few inborn capacities. This study investigates his main work on psychology, the De Anima, from this perspective. It is shown how Aristotle conceives of the soul's capacities and how he uses them to account for the souls of living beings. An account is offered of how Aristotle defines the capacities in relation to their activities and proper objects. The relationship of the body to the definition the soul's capacities is also considered. Against the background of his theory of science, it is argued that the capacities of the soul serve as causal principles in the explanation of the various life forms. Detailed readings are developed of Aristotle's treatment of nutrition, perception, and intellect, which show the soul's various roles as formal, final and efficient causes. The so‐called ‘agent’ intellect is interpreted as falling outside the scope of Aristotle's natural scientific approach to the soul. Other psychological activities, various kinds of perception (including ‘perceiving that we perceive’), memory, imagination, are accounted for in their explanatory dependency on the basic capacities. The ability to move spatially is similarly explained as derivative from the perceptual or intellectual capacities. It is argued that these capacities together with the nutritive may, as basic to the definition and explanation of the various kinds of soul, be understood as ‘parts’ of the soul. The book finally considers how the account of the capacities in the De Anima is adopted and adapted in Aristotle‘s biological and minor psychological works.

One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. This book explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. The book argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. The book also argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. On the whole, this book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or phronesis — an excellence of deliberating and making choices — and argues that phronesis is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues. This book also examines issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and “the virtuous person”.

Recent work in metaphysics has witnessed a noticeable turn to Aristotelian discussions of priority in one form or another. This revival of interests in Aristotle-inspired themes focuses on questions of what priority consists in and how it relates existents, rendering some basic and others derivative. For Aristotle, in contradistinction with (e.g.) Quinean metaphysical views, questions of existence are not considered central. Rather, the crucial questions are what types of existent are fundamental and what their grounding relation to derivative existents consists in. It becomes extremely important, therefore, to return to Aristotle's own theses regarding priority and to study them not only with exegetical caution but also with acutely critical philosophical eye. Aristotle deploys the notion of priority in numerous levels of his thought. In his ontology he operates with the notion of primary substance. His Categories, for instance, confer this honorific title upon particular objects such as Socrates or Bucephalus, while in the Metaphysics it is essences or substantial forms, such as being human, which are privileged with priority over certain types of matter or hylomorphic compounds (either particular compound objects such as Socrates or universal compound types such as the species human). The chief aim of the book is to understand priority claims of this sort in Aristotle's metaphysical system by setting out the different concepts of priority and seeing whether and, if so, how Aristotle's preferred prior and posterior items fit with these concepts.

This book presents a study of Pyrrho of Elis, who lived in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries BC and is the supposed originator of Greek scepticism. In the absence of surviving works by Pyrrho, scholars have tended to treat his thought as essentially the same as the long subsequent sceptical tradition which styled itself ‘Pyrrhonism’. This book argues, on the contrary, that Pyrrho's philosophy was significantly different from this later tradition, and offers a detailed account of that philosophy in this light. It considers why Pyrrho was adopted as the figurehead for that tradition and suggests that we should distinguish two phases within Pyrrhonism, of which the initial phase is much closer to Pyrrho's own thought than is the better-known later phase. The book also investigates the origins and antecedents of Pyrrho's ideas; in particular, Plato is singled out as an important inspiration. The result is a comprehensive picture of this key figure in the development of philosophy. The new claims that are put forward have major implications for the history and interpretation of ancient Greek thought.

This book offers an exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism. The subsequent sceptical tradition in philosophy has not done justice to Sextus: his views stand up today as remarkably insightful, offering a fruitful way to approach issues of knowledge, understanding, belief, and rationality. It is widely supposed that any form of scepticism that arrives at a global denial of the availability of rationally justified beliefs is self-refuting and unliveable. The author shows that the former objection can be disarmed by distinguishing between the mature Pyrrhonean sceptic's assessment of his negative epistemological arguments and the assessment forced upon his philosophical opponents by their own rationalistic code. The latter objection overlooks the role Sextus allocates to beliefs that are necessitated by the Pyrrhonist's psychological and biological constitution.