Philosophy of Mind

There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.

This book investigates what it means to say that mental states — thoughts, wishes, perceptual experiences, and so on — are about things in the world. The answer to this deep philosophical problem is a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. This book's teleological account centres on the claim that the content of an intentional state depends both on the information that it is supposed to carry and on the way in which it is used — whether to trigger a simple response, to help keep track of an object or place, to help in planning a route through the environment, or in a sophisticated process of reasoning. Along the way the book defends its view from recent objections to teleological theories, and indicates how it might be applied to some notable problems in the philosophy of mind.

The claim that people in developed countries have vast, unmet obligations to help people in developing countries is usually based on duties of kindness or a global extrapolation of justice among compatriots. This book constructs a different basis, the need for responsible engagement in transnational interactions in which power is currently abused. After arguing for an undemanding principle of beneficence and deriving duties of justice among compatriots from their special relations, the book develops standards of responsible conduct in current global interactions that determine: what must be done to avoid exploitation in transnational manufacturing, what framework for world trade and investment would be fair, what response to the challenge of global warming is adequate and equitable, what responsibilities to help meet basic needs arise when foreign powers steer the course of development, and what obligations are created by uses of violence to sustain global power. Through detailed empirical inquiries, the book argues that there has been a massive failure to live up to these standards, creating demanding duties to avoid undue advantage and repair abuses of power, on the part of developed countries in general and especially the United States. The book describes policies that would meet these obligations, leading obstacles, and the role of social movements in reducing injustice, especially a global form of social democracy expressing the book's perspective

This book takes a fresh look at happiness from a practical perspective: the perspective of someone trying to solve the wonderful problem of how to give himself a good life. From this perspective, “happiness” is the name of a solution to that problem for practical deliberation. The book’s approach to happiness falls within a tradition going back to ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, a tradition now called “eudaimonism.” Beginning with Aristotle’s seminal discussion of the role of happiness in practical reasoning, the book asks what sort of good happiness would have to be in order to play the role in our practical economies that it actually does play. Looking at happiness from this perspective, this book argues that happiness is a life of activity, with three main features: it is acting for the sake of ends we can live for, and living for them wisely; it is fulfilling for us, both as humans and as unique individuals; and it is inextricable from our connections with the particular persons, pursuits, and places that make us who we are. By returning to this ancient perspective on happiness, the book finds new directions for contemporary thought about the good lives we want for ourselves.

Contempt is often derided as a thoroughly nasty emotion inimical to the respect we owe all persons, but ethicists have said little about what contempt is or whether it deserves its ugly reputation. In Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt, Macalester Bell argues that we must reconsider contempt’s role in our moral lives. While contempt can be experienced in inapt and disvaluable ways, it may also be a perfectly appropriate response that provides the best way of answering a range of neglected faults. Using a wide range of examples, Bell provides an account of the nature of contempt and its virtues and vices. While some insist that contempt is always unfitting due to its globalism, Bell argues that this objection mischaracterizes the person assessments at the heart of contempt. Contempt is, in some cases, the best way to respond to arrogance, hypocrisy, and other vices of superiority. Contempt does have a dark side, and inapt forms of contempt structure a host of social ills. Racism is best characterized as an especially pernicious form of inapt contempt, and Bell’s account of contempt helps us better understand the moral badness of racism. Race-based contempt is best answered by mobilizing a robust counter-contempt for racists and others who contemn inaptly. The book concludes with a discussion of overcoming contempt through forgiveness. This account of forgiveness sheds light upon the broader issue of social reconciliation and what role reparations and memorials may play in giving persons reasons to overcome their contempt for institutions.

This book contributes to the idea that to have an understanding of the mind, consciousness, or cognition, a detailed scientific and phenomenological understanding of the body is essential. There is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. This book helps to formulate this common vocabulary by developing a conceptual framework that avoids both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and the inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Through discussions of neonate imitation, the Molyneux problem, gesture, self-awareness, free will, social cognition and intersubjectivity, as well as pathologies such as deafferentation, unilateral neglect, phantom limb, autism and schizophrenia, the book proposes to remap the conceptual landscape by revitalizing the concepts of body image and body schema, proprioception, ecological experience, intermodal perception, and enactive concepts of ownership and agency for action. Informed by both philosophical theory and scientific evidence, it addresses two basic sets of questions that concern the structure of embodied experience. First, questions about the phenomenal aspects of that structure, specifically the relatively regular and constant phenomenal features found in the content of experience. Second, questions about aspects of the structure of consciousness that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before one knows it, and do not normally enter into the phenomenal content of experience in an explicit way.

Attempts to answer the question of whether it is possible to understand agency as realized within a world construed ‘naturalistically’, that is, in terms of causal relations among events and states of affairs, or whether an adequate ontology requires sui generis acts that are essentially voluntary, such as volitions or agent-causation. Berent Enç defends the possibility of naturalizing agency via a causal theory of action (CTA). In doing that, he develops his key notion of basic action (Chs 2 and 3); he offers a ‘general and original’ solution to the problem of causal deviance (Ch. 4); and, he attempts to answer the objection that CTA removes the agent from the picture altogether by offering a purely causal model for the deliberative process that underlies practical reasoning (Ch. 5). Furthermore, the book discusses objections to volitional theories (Ch. 1), intentions and intentional action (Ch. 6), and the compatibility of Enç’s CTA with attractive accounts of autonomy and freedom (Ch. 7).

This book argues that our identity over time involves no psychological facts. Psychological accounts of personal identity lead to grave metaphysical problems, and the arguments for them are inconclusive. The book argues that we are animals, and thus have the purely biological identity conditions of animals.

This book looks to David Hume for help in advancing our understanding of the mind. The book claims his Treatise of Human Nature as the foundational document of cognitive science: it launched the project of constructing an empirical psychology on the basis of a representational theory of mind. Going back to this work after more than 250 years we find that Hume is remarkably perceptive about the components and structure that a theory of mind requires. Careful study of the Treatise helps us to see what's amiss with much 20th-century philosophy of mind, and to get on the right track. Hume says in the Treatise that his main project is to construct a theory of human nature and, in particular, a theory of the mind. This book examines his account of cognition and how it is grounded in his ‘theory of ideas’. It discusses such key topics as the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ ideas, the thesis that an idea is some kind of picture, and the roles that ‘association’ and ‘imagination’ play in cognitive processes. It argues that the theory of ideas, as Hume develops it, is both historically and ideologically continuous with the representational theory of mind as it is now widely endorsed by cognitive scientists. This view of Hume is explicitly opposed to recent discussions by critics who hold that the theory of ideas is the Achilles heel of his philosophy and that he would surely have abandoned it if only he had read Wittgenstein carefully.

Philosophy has as much to do with feelings as it does with thoughts and thinking. It requires sensitivity and a kind of devotion as well as curiosity about the world and a critical spirit. It is a fascination not only with abstract ideas and logically possible worlds but with concrete and very real human concerns and engagements, “the human condition” To be a philosopher is to be steadfastly attentive to what it means to be human, to the passions as well as to much-celebrated “rationality” It is to be concerned with what it means to “exist,” to the satisfactions and worries and real life joys and confusions that affect us all. That is why one of the canonical exhortations in philosophy, inherited from the Delphic Oracle via Socrates, has always been “know thyself,” for it is through unusually rigorous self-examination that we come to know not only ourselves but our Selves, our deepest feelings, fears, and hopes. Philosophy, accordingly, in its concern for feelings, requires not only emotional sensitivity but an understanding of the emotions, not as curious but marginal psychological phenomena but as the very substance of life. And yet, philosophy and philosophers have much more often than not shunned the emotions and defined their profession and themselves strictly in terms of reason and rationality. In the history of philosophy sensitivity is often dismissed as mere “sentimentality.” Sentiment and sentimentality are to be avoided. In this book I am concerned to defend sentimentality and the emotions–at least, some emotions–as essential to life. Foremost among the essential emotions are the sentiments of love and compassion. Not all of the sentiments are so kindly, however. Accordingly, I discuss not only such “moral sentiments” as sympathy and compassion but also grief, gratitude, love, horror, and even vengeance. All of these have suffered from considerable abuse, though from different quarters, but all of them play a central if not essential role in our experience and our lives.